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Introduction to the Second Issue
We did not try to prepare an issue of our Journal assessment of the present conditions, achievements,
completely homogenous in terms ot approaches, problems, limitations and prospects can offer a sound
concepts, terminology, proposals for future action. On basis for a really productive discussion on lessons
the contrary, we tried to bring together different alternatives and most promising options for further
approaches, opinions, including extremely critical development of South-South cooperation
ones. We do feel that only an open-minded and critical
JA N E Z  ST A N O V N IK :
Raúl Prebisch-In Memoriam
Controversial as this theoretical and political position the developing countries of the South was accompanied
was in the circles of orthodox economists, the jn the second part of the 1950s with the declining trends
«Commercial Policy...« became the Bible for the for the primary product prices in face of unprecedented
developing countries pressing for a new order in economic expansion of the North, the pressure for
international trade and finance. As the process of changing the trading rules was mounting,
progressive political liberatiom and independence of
H A N S W. S IN G E R :
South-South Trade Revisited, in a Darkening External Environment
In the current period when the values of self-reliance trade is a typical expression of this reversed way of
appear again in a brighter light, ECDC  is looked at looking at ECDC. Obviously both ways are equally
from the opposite point of view, i.e. as a stepping-stone justified... While in the earlier expansive period, ECDC
or halfway house away from excessive global looked like a halfway house on the way from undue ISI
integration towards a greater measure of self-reliance. towards global integration, in the new stagnationist
The label of «collective self-reliance« now often period it looks more like a resting point on the way
attached to ECDC and the promotion of South-South back to self-reliance.
B R A D FO R D  M O R SE :
Human Resources Development Through TCD C: Releasing the Latent 
Creativity of Over Two Billion Human Beings
If we define human resources development as cooperation for such ends has also been severely
enhancing the human condition and environment to constrained by the long-predominant assumption that
enable each person to express his or her creativity and development advice and other inputs come from the
contribute to the community to the optimum extent. North. This has been an attitude common in both
then we can all too readily see that South-South North and South.
J E F F R E Y  B. N U G EN T :
Some New Initiatives in South-South Cooperation for the Late Eighties
The main reason for the decline in attention given to idealization of schemes more motivated by theory than
South-South cooperation is that the efforts to date have designed to suit real world conditions. In order to
been so disappointing. The author argues that ECDC is promote ECDC, new initiatives are needed
a sound concept, and imperative for world stability and emphasising new areas of economic activiy (capital
PerhaPs even for survival. South-South cooperation goods industries, for instance), greater sharing of
initiatives should, however, avoid the mistakes of the experience, encouragement of countertrade
past: import of inappropriate development and arrangements, etc. In short, what is needed is a more
cooperation models from the North, failure to realize bottom-up approach, i. e. strengthening of developing
the high costs of negotiating, monitoring and enforcing countries" links at the firms" level,
the agreements among developing countries,
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IT W O ULD  APPEAR  that over the past 20 years or so, economic co-operation 
could have moved faster, with fewer failures, if those responsible for organizating 
co-operation were not always led by traditional models... Those models did not 
always take into account regional and subregional realities.
Philip Ndegwa, 1985.
The results of firms' foreign operations tend to be a mirror picture of their 
operations at home and general business practices and results on the home market 
in general.
Marjan SvetlióiC, 1986.
SADCC was not conceived as a platform for rhetoric nor as a plaything for those 
who desire a larger canvas on which to experiment with their patent solutions for 
Africa’s problems. Rather, SADCC has grown out of a common awareness of 
common interests. Its immediate objectives are well defined and limited. SADCC 
exists only to the extent that member States breathe life into its common 
programmes and projects. It does not have an autonomous existence, separate from 
the priorities of its member States.
SADCC Summit Chairman,
President Q. K. J. Masire,
Gaborone, 1982.
I I n t r o d u c t i o n 1
There is little disagreement that economic coordination or 
integration could be an important stimulus to economic 
development by African economies. The case rests on economies 
of scale, diversity of resources, natural geographic linkages (e.g. 
river basins, routes to the sea). In some parts of the continent 
(e.g. East, Francophone West, Francophone Central Africa) 
economic integration has been seen as continuing inter-colonial 
links forged before independence, in others (e.g. Western and 
Central Africa) as broadening them across previous 
metropolitan power dividing lines and in one (Southern Africa) 
as reversing an economically irrational pattern of exploitative 
integration imposed by South Africa, Portugal and the U K  (See 
Ndegwa 1964, 1985; Robson 1983; Hazelwood 1975; SAD CC 
1980; PTA 1981; Green and Seidman, 1968).
1 While the author served as an advisor to Uganda and Tanzania in respect to the East African 
Community and has served as a member of the SADCC London Liaison Committee (and its 
predecessors) since 1978, this study and its observations and conclusions are purely his personal 
responsibility.
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However, it is difficult to argue that - especially in Africa - 
Third World economic regionalism has achieved the aspirations 
set for it (Vaitsos 1978; Axline 1977; Axline and Mytelka 1980; 
Ndegwa 1985). Stagnation, glacially slow progress (Robson 
1983, 1985) or breakup - as in the case of the East African 
Community (AC R  1974-75/1977-78; Hazelwood 1979)-have 
been the rules not the exceptions in Africa despite a continuing - 
indeed increasing - verbal commitment to economic integration 
as desirable or even necessary.
11 S o u t h -So u t h  T r a d e , S o u t h e r n  M NCs a n d  R e g i o n a l i s m
South-South trade rose rapidly in the 1970s. An increasing share 
was carried on by southern enterprises including MNCs (or 
TNCs) based in southern economies and state trading 
corporations. But the trade gains were largely across the lines of, 
not within, regional integration groupings and the trade patterns 
and enterprises could rarely be described either as joint ventures 
of several developing countries or particularly interested in 
building equitable and durable regional cooperation. (See Chisti, 
Dunning, Green, Acosta-Suarez in Khan, 1986.)
The dominant pattern appears to have been a replication in 
miniature of North-South links within the South with - e.g. - 
Brazil partially displacing the U K  in Nigeria and Portugal in 
Angola. State trading enterprises were dominantly concerned 
with finding hard currency export markets and secondarily with 
acquiring scarce imports (notably oil during much of the 1973-84 
period) and rarely with finding balancing imports 
(Acosta-Suarez, op cit). While different from northern TNCs in 
size, specific comparative advantage and - perhaps - 
responsiveness to host government concerns, south based TNCs 
were more similar to than different from their northern siblings 
(Dunning, Green in Khan, 1986) and, indeed, tended to 
complement or cooperate with them almost as often as they 
competed with or threatened their positions (Wells in Khan, 
1986).
This picture can be overstated. Because enterprises’ behaviour 
abroad is influenced by their home environment and because 
southern TNCs have less own economic clout or government 
support, their relations with host governments and host country 
partners may be much less unequal than those characterising 
most northern TNCs (Svetlicic in Khan, 1986). Further the fact 
of increased South-South trade and of southern enterprise
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alterantives to TNC's does reduce South on North dependence 
and, perhaps, increase the bargaining room open to some of the 
less developed southern economies and enterprises (Green in 
Khan, 1986). However, what is clear is that the rise of Third 
World Regional MNCs jointly owned and managed across 
several southern economies, advocated and half predicted as the 
highroad to regional-led burgeoning of South-South links by the 
1976 UN CTAD  expert group, has not happened (U N C TA D , 
1976).
The only two significant exceptions are regional financial 
institutions and the Arab region. Neither appears to be 
generalisable. The continental regional financial institutions are 
not linked to any actual regional integration areas and their 
programmes do not appear particularly oriented to promoting 
regional or sub-regional economic links. The sub-regional 
financial institutions - e.g. in the Caribbean and East Africa - 
have been caught up in the balance of payment crises of their 
members and the descent into stagnation or dissolution of their 
sub-regional groupings and are now largely moribund. The Arab 
multinationals (Nugent in Khan, 1986) are a product of the 
interaction of the 1970s Arab sense of the need to underpin 
political with economic interaction and of the flows of investible 
foreign exchange generated by the oil boom. They have not been 
closely linked to an articulated regional integration project, are 
highly bureaucratic in a majority of cases and have not - with 
few exceptions - yet proven themselves to be financially viable. 
'1986s oil price collapse probably marks the end of their rapid 
growth and may place the very existence of some in jeopardy.
111 C a u s e  o f  W e a k n e s s
Analysis of the causes of weakness has concentrated on 
inappropriate application of the neo-classical common market 
model without adequate adaptation to Third World conditions 
(e.g. Axline and Mytelka 1980; Robson 1983) and on political 
will, its absence or political conflict (Axline 1978; Hazelwood 
1978; ACR 1974-75/1977-78). Certainly there is much to be said 
for these two perspectives both as to the causes of past failure 
and of possible restructuring for better results of existing and 
future endeavours.
It is noticeable that little attention has been paid to the 
structuring and management of economic integration in Africa 
(one of the rare exceptions is Simba and Wells 1984, done by the
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OEC D Development Centre for SADCC). This is perhaps not as 
surprising as it may seem - economists, political scientists and 
international relations experts are not, in general, oriented to 
studying management; regional integration bodies are somewhat 
outside the main streams of institutional types studied by 
management institutions and consultants; critical self-review on 
their o\\ n initiative is not characteristic of' managements, let 
alone of highly bureaucratised ones like those of most regional 
economic institutions.
Similarly - in SSA - there has been little - indeed virtually no 
- reflection on or analysis of what specific roles what kind of 
enterprises have played, should play or can carry out in the 
context of regional economic coordination and/or integration.
I he failure of most the first generation of colonial founded 
multi-state enterprises in transport and communication has been 
read as evidence against regional (i.e. interstate joint venture) 
enterprises more generally. African based mini-TNC activity 
while not non-existent is small and possibly diminishing. Private 
and public sector domestic enterprises (with some preferences 
against TNG subsidiaries) are implicitly seen as adequte to build 
up coordinated production structures linked by trade and 
finance flows but the plausibility of or conditions necessary for 
fulfilling this assumption are rarely examined. As the domestic 
enterprise orientation is dominantly either to local sources and 
markets or to specialised production for northern markets and 
northern import (of technology, management and partners as 
well as of goods and services) it is somewhat hard to see why 
their automatic conversion toward regional marketing, sourcing 
and other linkage promotion is seen as automatic even in the 
context of reduced tariffs, improved transport and 
communications and/or governmental agreements on desirable 
patterns of production coordination and balanced intra-regional 
trade expansion.
Nonetheless, it appears worthwile to examine regional 
economic cooperation institutions in Africa in terms of their 
management and operational processes and their actual or 
potential relation to regional trans of multinational enterprises 
to see what insights this may yield. This is especially true now 
that in the Sothern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SAD CC) a model exists with different theoretial, 
institutional and programmatic bases than the traditional 
common market approach and with an initial five year record of
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substantial achievement (SADCC, Overview 1986; Mmusi 1985; 
Green and Thompson 1986).
IV T h e  N e o -Cl a s s i c a l  M a r k e t  M o d e l
The traditional approach to regional economic integration 
centres on promoting trade by removing intra regional and 
harmonising extra regional tariff and other barriers to trade in 
order to achieve greater efficiency in resource allocation.2 The 
underlying assumptions include a diversified, flexible economy, 
full acceptance of the theory of comparative advantage, very 
limited state economic intervention and acceptance that gains in 
total regional output are desirable and should be pursued even if 
some members demonstrably lose (or believe that they do).
That these assumptions require radical adaptation to apply to 
fragmented inflexible, low income economies concerned with 
development has certainly not escaped economists. Substantially 
revised models have been constructed with greater or lesser 
degrees of modification of the neo-classical base.3 Nor have the 
political strains lacked critical examination.4
However, the basic points have rarely been put:
1. to create a non-interventionist regional body grouping states 
all of which are interventionist as to economic policy creates 
managerial as well as political strains almost certainly likely 
to rend the weaker party (the regional institutions);
2. the model provides no tools for managing distribution of 
gains (nor in practice for measuring them) - a gap sure to lead 
to region/state clashes since only a very absent minded state 
is unconcerned with trying to manage the division of gains 
between itself and outsiders;5
3. if regional integration is to succeed, regional production and 
intertrade must rise, necessarily involving enterprises and - if 
regional self-reliance is to be raised - especially domestic 
ones (public or private, cross-national or nationally based).
2 See Robson 1983, for a fuller exposition.
3 See ibid: Axline and Mytelka 1980; SADCC' (A. Nsekela, ed) 1980, theoretical and sectoral 
papers for examples of such adaptations as well as the non trade chapters of the PTA Treaty.
4 See Hazelwood 1975; Axline 1977;Vaitsos 1978; ACR 1975-75/1977-78 for analysis of 
political strains arising from the model.
5 The problem, of course, has not been overlooked. For a review of the efforts to solve it in the 
EAC see Hazelwood 1974, ¡979 and for the Caribbean, Axline and Mytelka 1980.
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Yet almost no attention to involving enterprises or identifying 
their regional concerns is identifiable in SSA regional 
groupings' operational programmes and little more in their 
public statements.
Another feature of the traditional model - at least in Africa6 - 
has been a strong central Secretariat. A Treaty sets out a body of 
requirements and stages to be accomplished. The Secretariat is 
responsible for managing and monitoring what is happening; for 
making studies and proposals for new stages and for managing 
meetings ol members states at official ministerial and heads of 
state level. Whatever its formal legal position, the Secretariat by 
its greater access to information, to analytical expertise and to 
time to concentrate on regional issues tends to set the agendas 
and often to dominate (manage in a pejorative sense) the 
decisions of member states. In order to get results Secretariats 
have often engaged in playing one state off against another, a 
short sighted managerial technique as combined with Secretariat 
dominated agendas it tends to concentrate state participation on 
squabbling over particular gains, costs or project locations.
While doubtless eff icient (even necessary) in the sense that it 
gets studies done, programmes agreed, resolutions adopted, 
differences apparently reconclied, this managerial/institutional 
style is dangerous:
1. it often results in all member states seeing the Secretariat and 
“ its” regional institutions as they, i.e. something outside, to a 
degree alien to and quite possibly in conflict with each and 
every member state; and, therefore,
2. member state commitment to take responsibility for and to act 
on the decisions agreed at meetings has on occasion been not 
merely low but virtually non-existent.
These unfortunate processes have been exacerbated by two 
special characterisics of economic integration efforts in Africa.
First, and less relevant today, was the existence of large 
autonomous departments or public corporations usually in 
transport, communications and power. These were even less 
amenable to control by or accountability to their nominal 
owners than the Secretariats and the losses many achieved and 
their arrogant refusal to provide information to, let alone accept
6 A somewhat different set of tensions exist in the case of the EEC  which - unlike the African 
bodies - has genuine aspirations to and some elements of supranationality. In that context the 
strains between Community (Commission-Secretariat-Assembly) and national institutions are 
somewhat less fraught and more productive.
direction from their national owners, particularly in East Africa7, 
certainly aggravated the tendency to see regional bodies as 
alien succubi rather than joint development tools. This problem 
is less acute simply because very few such regional corporations 
have survived, in itself perhaps a comment on their management 
styles and processes; but one leaving the potential for a new 
generation of transnational regional enterprises (or 
transregionally operating national ones) unanswered, indeed 
u n explored.
Second, both the theory and practice of economic integration 
as practiced have often been imposed from outside. The theory, 
as noted, is pure, second best, laissez faire (free market/no state 
intervention), static North Atlantic capitalist neo-classicism. It is 
a very exotic plant indeed in Africa and one wide open to the 
charge of intellectual imperialism or neo-colonialism. 
Institutionally the model has clearly been the EEC (on occasion 
to the extent of including infelicities and ambiguities straight 
from the Treaties of Rome), another instance of dubiously 
appropriate imports. The response to criticisms of narrowness or 
non-addressing of developmental issues has rarely been 
intellectually substantive. Rather it has taken the form of 
trimming the basic common market core with a number of 
semi-ornamental, ill related, non-binding and non-functional 
additions rather like C hristmas tree ornaments. Two examples 
are ECO W AS (see Robson 1983) and the PTA (Treats 1981 ).
Instrumentally the initial round of integration groupings were 
colonial in origin - by definition externally imposed. Most of the 
later wave are the children of the Economic Commision for 
Africa's quarter century crusade for economic unification. 
Unfortunately, in the process EC A has tended to become 
proprietorial and schoolmasterish with a certain impatience w ith 
governments which wished to alter its proposals and proposed 
texts in any substantial way. However right EC A mas liase been 
on the merits of the issues, this is hardly a svas to build 
goverment commitment to, or a habit of active participation in. 
the resulting institutions.8
7 The author writes from personal experience. Often Kenya-Uganda-Tanzania at official and 
ministerial level could agree on a course of action but were blocked by point blank active or 
passive refusal to comply (coupled with demands for funds) by corporation officials. In these 
cases the EAC Secretariat ended to be on the country side.
8 One of the Chairmen of the final negotiating session for the PTA indicates that he wanted to 
continue debate because he felt that Tanzanian, Mozambican, Angolan and Malagasy objections 
to draft texts could be overcome and their signing achieved. He felt that he was ordered by ECA 
to halt the debate and leave the disagreements. As a result those four states did not then join PTA 
- Tanzania has signed since but not put any of the PTA provisions into operation. Further, the 
former Chairman is notably ambivalent about both ECA and PT A - understandably he views 
both as ''they" and even the dissenting states as "we". See also Ndegwa 1985. Note 19.
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In respect Ui enterprises the colonial creations had two 
characteristics, hirst, a varying number ol highly bureaucratic, 
non-accountable (albeit sometimes technically efficient and 
reaping economies of scale) enterprises in the transport, 
communications and central banking (or predecessor monetary 
body) fields. Second, they paid little attention to and largely 
abstracted from the particular needs (other than absence of 
tariffs) of enterprises and particularly of domestic as opposed to 
home country based ones.
Since independence the first characteristic has changed 
dramatically. Most of the regional enterprises - Air Afrique and 
the two Franco-phone regional central banks are the major 
exceptions - have broken up and new ones are rarely high on the 
agenda. The second characteristic has changed nominally - in 
principle special provisions favour domestic over external 
enterprises - but not significantly in practice. (See Green in 
Khan, 1986.)
Some consequences:
The results of these factors include:
1. febrile activity leading to studies and proposals at Secretariat 
level;
2. effective state exclusion from planning;
3. meetings of states which either approve (with little real 
dialogue or meeting of minds) Secretariat proposals or defer 
them for want of any real alternatives;
4. subseqent lack of followup by states because they never felt 
the proposals and decisions truly belonged to or committed 
them;
5. increasing deterioration or stagnation of regional action and 
breakup of regional enterprises leading to still further 
alienation of member states;
6. paralleled by a low level bickering over division of particular 
gains and costs, usually resolvable by “ bugging turn”  
methods when things are going well but corrosive when the 
general atmosphere is one of decay;
7. as well as a lack of attention to or interaction with domestic 
enterprises far greater than that pertaining at national level.
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A topic requiring specific attention is external assistance. 
Regional bodies have - especially when they have corporations, 
research and training institutions, development banks - tended 
to receive substantial sums; donors too believe in economies of 
scale. In principle a multi country body should be able to 
manage/negotiate with donors more effectively than single 
countries.
In practice this seems not to have been the case - at least in the 
EAC. Donors became active participants in power struggles 
among member states and between them and the Secretariat 
and/or corporations. They both won the power to influence very 
significantly what EAC would do where and how and also (not 
necessarily intentionally) exacerbated internal tensions and 
eroded trust among member states; a result made much easier by 
the way both member states and the Secretariat managed both 
their EAC and their aid policies.
The concept of development propounded by most regional 
bodies in Africa is not at all clear. Certainly its links with people 
and benefits identifiable by them are rather low. Maximising 
trade by freeing markets - whatever its intellectual merits - has 
dubious political sex appeal. Further the bodies rarely (EA C  was 
fitfully an exception) managed to communicate to wider 
audiences than a handful of direct participants.
V  A n A l t e r n a t i v e  A p p r o a c h : T h e  C a s e  o f  SAD CC
The Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC) model is distinctly different in several respects. Its 
theoretical base is partly a highly adapted economies of scale in 
expansion of production including production of knowledge 
model (SADCC [Nsekela, ed] 1980) and partly and eclectic 
pragmatism based on the principle of state perception of 
common interests believed to be pursued more effectively in 
common than separately (SAD CC, Lusaka Declaration 1980; 
SADCC, Overview, Annex A 1986). The focus is on production 
with trade seen as consequential and instrumental not as a goal 
in itself.
The SADCC model is straightforwardly interventionist. The 
Lusaka Declaration (SAD CC  1980) quite bluntly outlines how 
economic dependency on, and political domination by, South 
Africa was constructed by intervention and not by free market 
forces and equally bluntly says that economic liberation must be 
attained in the same way. When at the Blantyre Annual
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( 'onlerence USA11) read a lecture on freeing the market and 
unleashing private enterprise, the Chairman firmly reitereted 
that the choice of instruments was for SA D C C ’s member States 
to decide, not for its cooperating partners (SA D CC  1981; 
Conference Report 1982 - U SA ID  and Chairman’s Closing 
Statements). The combination of a production oriented and an 
interventionist model have made SAD CC very much committed 
to concrete action (c.f. SAD CC Annual Progress Reports and 
Annex A 1986 Overview).
The institutional model is just as different from the traditional 
one. The central Secretariat is small9 and, while it has key 
diplomatic, conference organisational, internal cordination and 
publication, and - when so directed - study production duties, it 
clearly is the creature not the master of the member States. Its 
proposals can be - and frequently are - rejected for state 
presented substitutes or significantly modified. A weak central 
Secretariat and a commitment to action are apparently 
contradictory. The SADCC resolution is to:
1. allocate sectoral (e.g. energy, food security, agricultural 
research, transport and communications) coordination to 
specialist units supervised and run by designated member 
states and expanding (in one case - transport and 
communications - to a fully Hedged commission) as agreed 
programmes are put into practice so that programme unit 
professionals number about 100 and those in the central 
Secretariat 5.
2. devolve project implementation responsibility on the state(s) 
in which it is located.
Roth are in line with SA D C C ’s determination to see that member 
States are fully involved in all stages from concept through 
proposal through planning and mobilisation to implementation 
and review. While accepting that this may be cumbersome or 
slow, SAD CC (Annex A Overview 1986) sees it as essential if 
decisions are to be perceived as related to real subsequent action, 
to have member State commitment and understanding behind 
them and to be acted upon.
Whether the distribution problem has been faced in a novel 
way or side-stepped for later action is less than clear. SA D C C  
(Lusaka Declaration 1980) is explicitly committed to “ equitable”
9 Indeed until the end of 1982 it was a responsibility of a member State - Botswana - not a 
separate institution.
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regional integration. To date this has been achieved partly by 
having a mix of programmes and projects in each sector seen by 
all interested member States as benefitting them,10 partly by 
rigorous economy on overhead budgets and partly by raising a 
very substantial proportion of sectoral as well as project costs 
externally. The first branch can be maintained; the second will to 
an extent weaken absolutely (e.g. as inreasing numbers of 
sectoral unit staff are both citizens and SAD CC paid); the third 
is fairly clearly transitional.
SADCC has avoided the Christmas Tree approach. Sectors 
have been rejected," pobably up to half of proposed projects do 
not reach agreed regional priority lists and after the initial surge 
new projects and programmes are relatively few and usually very 
carefully studied. This is surprising as a common interest 
approach lacks the self defined core of the traditional common 
market one. The answer appears to be that SADCC has 
rigorously tested proposals against three principles;
1. would they reduce dependence - especially on South Africa?
2. would they meet a critical regional developmental need not 
equally well pursued nationally?
3. did they represent areas of perceived common interest - on 
w'ays and means as well as goals12 - among SAD CC member 
States?
Whatever else can be said of SA D C C ’s model, it is original 
and indigenous to the region. One might almost say it springs 
jointly from perceptions of present overriding needs and from 
views on the nature of the failure (or inequity) of past integration 
schemes. SADCC had neither a fairy godmother nor a sinister
10 Some States are not very interested in certain sectors. SADCC does not require projects or 
even programmes to be of interest to all members and even at sectoral level serious interest of 6 of 
the 9 members is seen as adequate even though 9 would be preferable.
11 Indeed one may suspect that one or two of the present ones would either not have been 
approved or would have been located elsewhere except for the initial determination to see that 
each member State had a sector of real interest to itself to coordinate to ensure its full 
involvement.
12 The long delay in setting up a Trade Sector programme relates to agreement on a common 
interest in principle but linked with moderately serious disagreement on ways and means. It is 
fairly typical of SADCC, however, that it has kept trying to resolve these (with a series of 
in-house, regional team and consultancy studies as inputs into official and ministerial dialogue). 
If-  as seems likely - agreement is reached in 1986-87, then implementation will be able to 
proceed because there will be a real common agreement on what is to be done, not a papered 
over chasm.
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godfather1' and so is viewed by its member States as very much 
their creation in which they take pride of authorship and 
responsibility for maintenance and development.
To describe SADCC's record in detail (see AC R 78-79/84-85; 
S A IX  C Annual Progress Reports; SADCC Overview 1986; 
Green and Thompson 1986) would go beyond the scope of this 
chapter both in topics and in space. However a brief checklist or 
tour d hori/on is needed to indicate that substance exists as well 
as form.
SADCC sectoral programmes now number 13 with over 500 
projects for which as of February 1986 about S I,400 million had 
been negotiated (and in substantial part spent) and S I,400 more 
w as under negotiation (up from S I , I 50 and S 1,100 million at the 
end of Jul\ 1985) out of a total cost of the order of S5,500-6,000 
million. In main sectors detailed programmes (including 
coordination of traffic Hows and regulations and direct 
interaction among enterprises including railroads, ports, airlines, 
post offices and power corporations) beyond projects were also 
substantial. Over 1985 SA IX  C conducted a series of review's and 
established criteria for linked 5 year sectoral perspective plans 
(Overview 1986. especially Annexes A,C) as well as producing a 
regional Macro-Economic Survey (SADCC 1986). Taken 
together this record appears to demonstrate a substantial and 
grow ing volume of action, an evolution of coordination toward 
longer time frames and more sectoral interaction and an 
intensive - and fairly open - self evaluation exercise.
The results managerially include;
1. intense state involvement in planning, programming and 
implementation; with
2. uneven progress by sector depending in part on the energy 
and capaeit) of the coordinating state and its unit;
5. a distinct overburdening of technical units and the Secretariat 
with meeting demands related to concrete action;
4. a real sense of common purpose backed by substantial
numbers of personal contacts (from officials through Heads
13 Two candidates have been floated - the USSR and the EEC . Both are clearly risible; the 
USSR has never taken a serious interest in S A IX ’C and a model less similar to the EEC ’s would 
be hard to imagine. If any "outside" agency or agencies were to be cited they should be the 
Government of Botswana and the Eront Line States but both of these are part and parcel of the 
S A IX ’C' region. S A IX ’C' has used expatriates but it is notable that all \vorking on key policy and 
strategy issues have been individually selected by SA IX 'C  and were responsible solely to it.
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of State at least 1,000 people have participated in operational 
SADCC meetings); but
5. also a concern that, while progress is being won, greater speed 
and efficiency is required given the tasks confronting SAD CC 
in meeting the goals set for it and the burdens laid upon it by 
its member States.
Enterprise communications have been weak. This may reflect 
SADCC's preoccupation with other requirements which clearly 
had to be carried out by governments or a belief that the 
coordination frame it is creating will create a climate of opinion 
(including member State opinion in respect to the enterprises 
they own) which will result in increased enterprise links. 
However, - with the partial exception of Zimbabwe and Malawi 
- domestic manufacturing and external trading enterprises 
(public or private) are not now oriented to seeking regional 
sources or markets - let alone regional technology or 
management partners. Thus - ironically - SA D C C ’s attitude to 
enterprise level coordination and regional economic links may to 
date be too luissez /'¿lire.
V I  SADCC A n d  E x t e r n a l  F i n a n c e : M a n a g i n g  T h e  T r a n s f e r
P r o c e s s
SADCC has always seen external cooperation (its standard 
terminology avoids the use of the terms donor and aid) as 
important both for securing understanding and support and for 
mobilising finance. This is typified by the designation of the 
Annual Conference w ith co-operating partners in the Lusaka 
Declaration (SADCC 1980). In itself that may not be particularly 
unusual. However its managment of the process is virtually 
unique.
The Annual Conference is managed distinctive!) both as to 
format and as to style. To treat the format first:
1. the Conference is organised and invitations issued wholly by 
SADCC;
2. all documentation (and it is recognised by the external 
partners as of high quality) is prepared by the SAD CC 
coordinating units and Secretariat;
3. the main opening and closing session speakers are chosen by 
SADCC;
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4. substantial time is provided for dialogue on sectors going well 
beyond “ pledging” and involving two way exchanges of ideas 
and criticisms as well as some discussion on development 
themes broader than SA D C C ;14
5. the Conference Communiqué (approved by all participating 
governments and international organisations) is drafted by 
the Conference Chairman (SA D C C ’s Ministerial Level 
Chairman who has throughout been the Vice President of 
Botswana) not by a committee o f ’donors’ and ’recipients’
This format does affect the tone of the conference which, unlike 
the typical donor group, is on an agenda SAD CC chooses and 
also presents on its own terms with the cooperating partners 
responding. Over time the Conference despite the obligatory 
time for the invited delegations to speak - has become less and 
less a pledging circus and more a forum for reflecting on, 
reaffirming and exploring next steps in cooperation.
SAD CC has also chosen to develop a distinctive style of 
presentation to the Conferences:
1. extensive sectoral documentation on overall sectoral goals, 
programmes and results (including old project status) as well 
as new or represented projects for finance;
2. an Overview which (together with the Chairman’s initial 
Statement) highlights key issues beyond sectors and projects 
as SADCC sees them;
3. a busineesslike tone concentrating on making concrete 
progress with very little rhetoric and a good deal of 
friendliness;
4. combined with toughness on perceived threats - e.g. 
discriminatory aid which excluded certain named states and 
more persistently South African agression and economic 
destabilisation.
The last point is illustrative. SADCC has achieved an image of 
competent economic action orientation. Therefore, it has been 
able to make itself heard when it says that as an economic 
organisation it cannot overlook economic destablisation, 
sabotage and aggression which undermine its member States’
14 The Nordic states have instituted the tradition of a Nordic paper each year on some broad 
theme they consdier relevant, e.g. Agricultural Policy (especially price policy) in 1984 and 
Employment in 1986.
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economies and (literally) destroy key projects and that its 
cooperating partners have a duty to cooperate on this problem as 
well as that of finance (Overview 1986, including Annex B 
estimating the costs, and “ Conference Communiques”  in 
Conference Reports).1''
Substantively SADCC has managed (in both senses) several 
innovations in resource Hows:
1. in 1980 when renovation and rehabilitation funding was 
rarely acceptable (as opposed to being fashionable as it has 
since become) SAD CC carefully packaged regional transport 
rehabilitation as standard projects and won acceptance of 
many of them (so much so it was later criticised for not 
stressing rehabilitation!);
2. in the Lusaka Declaration (SA D CC  1980), the priority of 
drought resistant crop research oriented to poor peasants was 
laid down and negotiated tenaciously for five years until it 
came into operation (again the fashionability of the field rose 
but partly because of SA D C C ’s posing it);
3. food security16 was developed into an articulated, 
programmed area which attracted funds inter alia leading to 
the first national/regional coordinated early warning system 
in Africa coming into operation over 1986/87.
As noted, early finance mobilised or under negotiation as of 
February 1986 was of the order of $2,800 million. Even 
accepting that by no means all was additional, the 80% of that 
amount which is foreign demonstrates that SADCC' has come to 
be viewed as a viable channel for routing support with a 
project/programme list of above average quality.
Clearly SADCC has not managed (in either sense) to end the 
influence of funding agencies on projects and programmes: what 
they do not fund is unlikely to be done. On the other hand the 
mobilisation process has been so managed as to win several
15 When the topic was first raised at the Blantyre SADCC it was controversial and three states 
and one international organisation sought to have it deleted from the Communique. It is now an 
accepted Overview, Conference and Communique topic even if one which still makes certain 
governments somewhat uneasy.
16 Food security was in fact not on SA D C C ’s priority list prior to the 1979 Arusha exploratory 
conference with cooperating partners to be. It was suggested by them and accepted by SADCC', 
subject to being able to design plausible regional projects (on which the suggestors had few 
concrete ideas). The ready acceptance lends credence to SADCC's genuine willingness to listen 
and the articulation (begun by the 1980 Maputo Conference and fairly fully done a year later) to 
its innovative capacity.
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significant gains (see Green and Thompson 1986):
1. choice by funders is from a regionally agreed SAD CC  list 
(offers of projects not on the list are unwelcome and, in 
practice, not made);
2. SAD CC states have held together on their priorites and not 
allowed donors to manipulate them to change project or (with 
one or two borderline exceptions) their locations;
3. the attempt to discriminate by excluding three states from 
benefits accruing to funding a major project was so managed 
that the would-be funder restated its conditions, additional 
funding was secured and both the project and regional unity 
survived;
4. SADCC has evolved means to focus funding on key 
sub-sectoral project groups, e.g. the 1983 Dar Harbour, 1985 
Tazara and 1986 Beira Port and Port Corridor Conferences 
(serviced by the Southern African Transport and 
Communications Commission) have broken bottlenecks 
caused by funding gaps that did threaten cohesiveness of 
programme implementation.
In 1986 SAD CC entered into two new agreements. The one, a 
“ Memorandum of Undersanding On Programming of Lomé I I I  
Regional Funds” 7 was the First case in which the EEC  agreed a 
set of principles, guidelines and allocation patterns for the use of 
Lomé Convention Regional Funds with an A CP Regional 
Organisation. The second, a “ Joint Declaration On Expanded 
Economic And Cultural Cooperation Between The Nordic 
Countries And the SAD CC Member States”  (together with a 
“ Memorandum” on ways toward programme development)18 set 
out to lay the foundation for region to region cooperation 
beyond aid including agreed development and South-North 
economic relations principles and on trade (including SA D C C  
exports to the Nordic region) and investment.
In fact external resource mobilisation management has become 
more important and more distinctive than SA D C C ’s founders 
anticipated or wished;
1. SAD CC initially understimated the scale of the agreed 
regional programmes (and thus the funding needed);
17 Harare, 28-11-86.
18 Harare, 29-11-86.
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2. and - like most other forecasters - did not expect the 1980 
world recession to endure through 1983 and he followed by so 
weak a recovery; nor
3. the explosive rise of South African aggression which over 
1980-84 cost SADCC states on the order of $10,000 million 
(Overview, 1986, Annex B) or more (Green and Thompson 
1986).
As the second and third points reduced domestic resources 
available, the only way SAD CC could advance was to raise more 
foreign funds. In fact as a new vehicle, with a respectable set of 
proposals largely for major, import intensive projects (the type 
usually suitable for regional rather than national prioritisation) 
SADCC proved very effective at this - which doubtless 
increased member State commitment to and enthusiasm for its 
priority coordination process.
One problem as of 1986 is arguably a result of success at 
external fund raising - 80% plus external funding is too high a 
share. Managing resource mobilisation with such a high 
proportion of external funds is always difficult and even more so 
when a main goal is to keep overall control of the process in 
African state hands.
SA D CC ’s main channels of relations with external financial 
sources are not well adapted to raising funds from or for 
enterprises. Exploration of fora more suited to that role has 
begun in the industrial sector - with an initial conference 
including TNCs on the external side and domestic companies 
within SADCC member State delegations held in Harare in 1984 
and another scheduled for Lusaka in 1986/87 - and are 
envisaged in the Nordic Agreement. Much of the transport 
funding is for national corporations (bi-national in the Tazara 
railway case) serving more than one state as may be some in 
respect to the electricity subsector but this is within the old 
coordinated public utility ambit not a true innovation.
V II C o n t r a s t s  F r o m  a  m a n a g e m e n t  T e s t  P e r s p e c t i v e
It may be useful to compare the traditional and SAD CC models 
in operation on the basis of a set of standard management 
criteria. The one used here is the eight point model which J. B. 
Wanjui (Wanjui 1986) draws up on the basis of the work of 
Peters and Waterman.19
19 See T. J. Peters and R. H. Waterman, In search of Excellence, Warner, New York, 1982 for a 
fuller exposition of the origins and derivation of this approach which is based on detailed studies 
ot large USA corporations.
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Bias Toward Action. The traditional economic integration 
groupings do not in practice have any such bias. They have a 
bias toward procrastination, delay and substituting statements of 
aspiration for programmes to implement them. In most sectors 
S A IX  C has had a clear bias toward action, i.e. to getting studies, 
projects and programmes functioning.Simple Form/Lean Staff. The traditional model is simple as to 
form - everybody is at the centre. However in respect to central 
staff it is anything but lean - typical administrative and 
professional staff to programme ratios are very self indulgent by 
African institutional standards. SA D C C ’s structure is - despite 
being decentralised - relatively simple with clear flow routings 
and divisions of labour. Both at secretariat and coordinating unit 
level emaciated might be a better term than lean for staffing, i.e. 
there appears to be a tendency to carry this virtue to extremes.C ontinuous Contact With Customers. The traditional strong 
Secretariat model leads to episodic and often not very close 
contact between the regional institutions and their member 
governments at all levels. In the case of regional corporations the 
situation has often been even worse. The “ customer is a 
nuisance, he should buy what is on display, pay the marked price 
and shut up" syndrome has been only too common. SA D C C  
operates by contact - with its member States at all levels and 
with external cooperating partners. Technical difficulties make 
this contact less continuous than it might be but basically it does 
exist. As a result SADCC is in practice very responsive to 
member State priorities and open to listening to - and 
moderately often acting on - suggestions from external partners 
if they are complementary to or consonant with member State 
priorities.
Both approaches are weak in respect to enterprises. The 
traditional abstracts from them in principle and treats them as - 
somewhat troublesome - peripheral nuisances in practice. 
SAD CC is perhaps more attuned to the importance of 
enterprises and has paid attention to coordination of activities 
and outlook among them in energy and transport but has not, to 
date, directly addressed the role of national and multinational 
enterprises in building a regional economy.
Productivity Through People. This is a hard area in which to 
evaluate either model. Hierarchical centralisation, limited 
autonomy and lagging programming have on occasion - but not 
always - reduced traditional regional body personnel’s morale, 
ability to participate in the managerial process and concern with
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increasing their own and the organisation’s productivity.
SADCC with smaller units, more autonomy, less bureaucratic 
tradition, greater interaction among national and regional staff 
would certainly appear to have a more participatory 
management process in which participation, creativity and 
commitment are more likely (as well as more important). 
However this is an unstudied area on which any tentative 
assessment (in this case positive for a majority of, but not all, 
units) must rest on ustructured personal observations.Operational Autonomy To Encourage Enterpreneurship. This 
the traditional bodies - with the partial exception of the EA C  - 
have lacked. The combination of imported models, institutions 
and - on occasion - even texts with hierarchical, centralised, 
bureaucratic structures assured and assures that. The apparent 
innovations tend to be little adapted imports from other 
groupings which lead to major contextual problems20 and 
probably reinforce the basically conservative approach.
Regional enterprise autonomy has often been real but with the 
unsound sense of non-accountability and within highly 
bureaucratised and inflexible operating modes. SAD CC  has 
given major operational autonomy and most units have 
innovated - occasionally in somewhat odd directions which is an 
inevitable price of autonomus innovation. Sectoral programmes 
are quite noticeably not carbon copies of each other and in most 
cases the divergence does relate to underlying realities of the 
sector.
Strees On Key Goals/Values. The common market type 
integration effort does stress key values - freer trade, more trade, 
less state intervention. The problem is whether these values are 
actually appropriate to African development processes. The 
record to date is not very reassuring. SA D C C ’s four Lusaka 
Declaration (SADCC 1980) values: reduction of dependence, 
especially on South Africa; building equitable regional 
cooperation on the basis of common interests; mobilising 
domestic and external resources to build cooperation and 
creating an international climate of understanding and support 
for SAD CC’s goals, have been kept in sight and are repeatedly
20 Examples are ECOW AS and PTA provisions limiting eligibility of firms on the basis of 
domestic ownership and management. These are virtually copied from the Andean Pact. In the 
PTA and ECOWAS regions they would exclude most local manufactures from the benefits of the 
tariff preferences. As the ownership and management patterns differ from state to state and 
between new and established products, the present formulations are exceedingly divisive - 
especially in PTA. The desirability of principle is probably not in doubt but the lack of regionally 
relevant phasing and reviewable exemption procedures is.
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stressed. On the record to date they have dominated the 
programme and - with the possible exception of domestic 
resource mobilisation - substantial progress has been made 
toward each.Emphasising What You Know Best. Trade preference bodies 
certainly do stress preparations for and initial steps toward a 
common market. The problem is that the limited formal and 
exiguous trade expansion results (except in the EA C ) raise 
doubts as to how well they really “ know best”  in the African 
context. SADCC, by definition has not to date been able to 
honour this principle. It started with no achieved areas of 
expertise and has been building thirteen sectoral programmes 
from scratch. However, with a very partial exception,21 new 
sectors have not been added since 1982 and several tentative and 
one articulated proposal have ben rejected. While sectoral scope 
has expanded, the linkage to ongoing work is usually clear, e.g. 
Transport and Communications adding posts and meteorology 
to its covered sub-sectors in “ Loose/Tight Controls”  (combining 
flexible autonomy with uniform emphasis on major goals). It is 
almost accurate to say that in practice centralised, common 
market promoting regional bodies have tended to achieve the 
reverse. There has been little flexibility, decentralisation or 
creativity. On the other hand the “ tight”  emphasis on major 
goals has not led to rapid progress toward their attainment. 
SADCC has a more mixed record. The decentralised, creative 
autonomy certainly exists. But in some cases sectors either made 
very slow progress, seemed to have a very narrow perception of 
their scope22, or wandered into areas not very closely linked to 
the balance of the SADCC programme nor to its basic goals. 
Thus the tight attention to the four basic values or goals was (and 
is) less than fully effective. The 1985 review and especially the 
“ Guidelines for Sectoral Strategies”  (1986 Overview, Annex C) 
represent a clear attempt to correct this without reducing useful 
looseness. Initial results - as shown in 1986 sectoral papers for 
the Harare Annual Consultative Conference - are mixed23 but 
are clearly in the right direction.
21 Tourism began to operate as a sector in 1984/84. However, it had been proposed much 
earlier and seems to be basically an information and experience exchange sector unlikely to 
propose major projects. Information Ministers have also begun to meet to coordinate and 
exchange data on national programmes but have specifically disavowed any desire to be a formal
SADCC sector.
22 e.g., the veterinarian led livestock sector did not expand its focus beyond major disease 
control to other aspects of animal husbandry until 1985.
23 But some changes were major. Manpower’s Development carried out a complete strategic 
and sub-sectoral priority reformulation creating clear links between its work and that of other
sectors.
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Neither format to date relates well to enterprises in trade or 
production - public or private sector, single or multi-country 
based. Formal preferences (e.g. PTA) for domestic firms have not 
in practice become operational. Relating to interested Chambers 
of Commerce and Commercial Banks beyond polite interest has 
not yet been achieved by SAD CC albeit its production 
coordination approach logically reqires either multinational 
enterprises or linkages among nationally based production 
and/or trading enterprises more integral and lasting than simple 
one-off contracts to buy and sell. One interesting exception - not 
formally within SAD CC but clearly arising out of the regional 
outlook it has built - is the Botswana Meat Corporation’s 
becoming the selling agent for the Zimbabwe Cold Storage 
Commission in respect to Zimbabwe’s E EC  beef quota. This 
multi year arrangement both represents a regional (versus a 
TNC) enterprise link and a coordination of the two economies' 
beef sales to EEC. It may be that the patterns of cooperation and 
outlook built up by SAD CC at state level will result in more such 
joint or coordinated endeavours. Certainly they have caused 
substantially increased interest by domestic enterprises in 
regional markets and sources.
V III T o w a r d  T e n t a t i v e  C o n c l u s i o n s
The comparison of the traditional and SAD CC  approaches to 
economic regionalism (or sub-regionalism in ECA  terminology) 
stronlgy suggests management does matter. SADCC's 
managerial process is distinctly different and - while far from 
perfect - appears much closer to normally endorsed 
management tests and techniques.
Certain aspects of SA D C C ’s management style are adaptable 
to other forms of economic regionalism. The most evident is full 
governmental involvement and decentralisation of programming 
to place power squarely in member government hands and to 
create direct government/programme links for each member 
State. This has been fairly regularly commended by SAD CC 
Conference Communiqués endorsed by external partners24 and 
also in partners' statements (SA D CC  Conference Reports). More 
important, it was also endorsed by the O AU 1985 Addis Ababa 
Summit25 which commended it to other African regional 
organisations as an innovation to adopt. A logical consequence
24 e.g. “ Conference Communique", Harare, 31-1-86. Para 7.
25 Resolutions, Addis Ababa, July 1985.
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of such action would be to focus attention on how to resolve the 
present conflict in traditional regional bodies between economic 
policies which are dirigiste laissez faire26 at regional and 
interventionist at national levels because once fully involved 
states will presumably see the conflict more clearly and attempt 
to resolve it.
Why SADCC has performed better on managerial tests is not 
entirely clear albeit part of the reasons - as discussed above - 
would seem to How from its substantive model of political 
economic integration and from the fact that it was the creation of 
its member governments. Another factor may be an above 
normal interest in management and evaluation.
As mentioned, one of the relatively rare studies on 
management of economic regionalism in Africa was done for 
SADCC (Simba and Wells 1984). Similarly in 1984-85 SAD CC  
carried out a throughgoing review of procedures as well as 
substance including getting the opinions of external partners and 
member states on the basis of which it reported to member States 
to the OAU (1986 Overview, Annex A) as well as drawing up 
guidelines for sectoral management and perspective planning 
(1986 Overview, Annex C) which did influence the process and 
content of almost all of the sectoral documentation and 
presentations at Harare.
SA D C C ’s connceptualisation of development is also clearer - 
at least to the lay person - than that of most other regional 
economic organisations. It is directed to coordinated 
enhancement of production (including transport and 
communications, training and knowledge); increasing 
oportunities for higher productivity by the peasant farmer and 
enhancing food security; meeting the basic needs of the peoples 
of its member states; reducing external depedence, especially on 
South Africa. All of these are concepts which are widely 
understandable. Further, the majority of the programmes and 
projects can be seen to be related to them. Drought resistant 
staple grain research oriented to peasants has a clear link to basic 
needs, peasant incomes, food security. Rebuilding and 
protecting rail, road and pipeline links to Maputo, Beira, Nacala 
and Dar es Salaam can be seen to be relevant to reducing
26 Dirigiste in the sense that the steps toward and timetables for approaching a common market 
often appear to bear little relation to structural and institutional patterns or existing market 
relations and to be imposed from above at least as arbitrarily as any other type of economic 
intervention.
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dependence on Soutli Africa27 as can building an international 
airport in Lesotho and earth satellite stations bypassing the 
Johannesburg external telecommunications hub.
Whether SADCC has managed to communicate is a question 
whose answer depends partly on “ to whom?”  It does produce 
public Annual Progress Reports, Overviews, Sectoral 
Documentation .and, now, Regional Macro-Economic Surveys 
and has published an informative but fairly simple handbook.
SADCC's internal communications are intelligible to those 
directly involved, e.g. Southern African Centre for Coordination 
of Agricultural Research (SA C C A R ) work is understandable to 
agricultural researchers, extension managers and - perhaps less 
uniformly - ministerial officials. Member States and external 
cooperating partners perceive themselves as well informed.
Press relations and those with researchers are more 
problematic. However, SAD CC pays more attention to the press 
- and gets more informed coverage - than is usual for Afican 
regional organisations or the economic programme sections of 
African governments. A somewhat analogous situation exists in 
respect to researchers. That SAD CC  is concerned is shown by 
the fact that one of its few new Secretariat posts is for a press and 
publicity officer who inter alia is to write simple language 
features and liaise with member State press agencies on their 
distribution.28
Whether this reaches the women with the jembe or the market 
basket or the man with the axe or at the desk is another matter. 
Except when specific projects are seen as part of the SAD CC 
regional priority Programme of Action, probably not. That is a 
weakness it shares with national economic development 
management.
In respect to enterprises the most than can be said is that no 
false moves have been made, a few tentative initiatives begun 
and a climate favourable for inter-enterprise expansion of 
regional links created. What SAD CC  initiatives are needed - 
beyond transport and electricity is unclear. In general neither 
public nor private sector multi-state ownership is likely to prove 
widely satisfactory and multi-state operations (other than
27 A point reinforced by South Africa's frenzied efforts to keep these lines closed or limping and 
to divert traffic from them to its own. SADCC and RSA are equally convinced that the key to the 
former's economic liberation from the latter’s regional economic hegemony is transport, (ef 
Green and Thompson, 1986.)
28 A first set of such featues and/or background material for them was distributed in March 
1985 on the occasion of the April 1985 Fifth Anniversary of the Founding Summit and Lusaka 
Declaration.
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intra-regional trade) by enterprises based in one state - while 
existing to a limited extent and offering possibilities for some 
expansion - is unlikely to be an adequate modality by itself. 
Multi-national endeavours encompassing sourcing, marketing, 
technology and management arrangements going beyond 
normal arms' length commercial transactions may hold out more 
promise. Since many of the enterprises in question are public 
sector, state action to encourage exploring such possibilities is 
likely to prove crucial. Expanded trade is likely to need 
regionally or nationally based trading firms with regional 
knowledge and orientation and a perception that import sources 
are us critical as export markets to harmonious trade growth in a 
context of largely inconvertible currencies. In several states these 
are likely to be state owned or joint ventures so that again 
government innovatory thinking is needed. However, the most 
important single requirement for SAD CC in respect to enterprise 
cooperation in regional development may be to build up more 
substantive and closer channels of communication with domestic 
enterprises and enterprise groupings such as Chambers of 
Commerce.
The lesson to be learned is clearly not that SA D C C ’s approach 
is perfect. One of the strenghts of SADCC - critical self 
evaluation - would lead it to be among the first to reject any 
such accolade. Rather they may be:
1. having a clear, self defined strategic perspective
2. innovation in structure, programming and management 
matters:
3. programmes, external relations and management need to be 
related to goal and structural characteristics;
4. reflection on and improvement of results should be a built-in 
part of the regional operational and management process;
5. presentation of political economic goals in developmental 
terms relating to people and their communication to - at the 
least - broader audiences than usually receive them now is 
perfectly possible and is based on sound technical, 
professional and mangerial work not public relations
gimmicks.
M ay 1986
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